The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old Romance Restored by Uslander, Eric M.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 6 | Number 3 Article 6
2000
The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old
Romance Restored
Eric M. Uslander
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and
Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric M. Uslander, The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old Romance Restored, 6 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 347 (2000)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol6/iss3/6
Summer 2000 347
The Democratic Party and Free Trade:
An Old Romance Restored*
Eric M. Uslaner"*
I. Introduction.
For most of the twentieth century the Democrats were the party of free trade and the
Republicans the party of protection. The Republican Congress, backed by a G.O.P.
President, passed the protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930. Most economists and
virtually all Democrats blamed this tariff for the onset of the Great Depression. And for
more than three decades the Democrats waved the red shirt of Smoot-Hawley against the
Republicans. They warned voters that Republicans were the tool of special interests who
cared not a whit about the overall performance of the economy.
By the late 1960s, and especially during the 1970s and 1980s, the political winds had
shifted on trade policy. The Democrats had moved toward protectionism. Increased glob-
al competition and two energy crises put pressure on the American economy and espe-
cially the jobs of the middle and lower classes-the Democratic Party's electoral base. The
global economy led business to become more supportive of free trade. The Republicans
followed along and equated free trade with open markets. Smaller government meant
fewer favors for "special interests"-especially for industries that sought protection from
the state, President Ronald Reagan believed. The parties had switched positions on trade. '
By the 1990s, with the ascension of Bill Clinton to the White House, the Democrats
once more picked up the mantle of free trade. Republican President George Bush initiat-
ed the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1991, which extended the open markets
accord with Canada to Mexico. Yet it was Clinton, a Democratic President, who pushed a
skeptical American public and an equally questioning Democratic Congress toward sup-
port for the accord in 1993 (cf. Uslaner, 1998a, 1998b). The third ranking Democrat in
the House leadership, Representative David Bonior (MI), led the opposition to the free
trade pact; the number two leader, Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (MO), was less
vocal but nonetheless remained a critic. While Republicans were stronger supporters of
free trade than Democrats, Clinton did get the votes of forty percent of the Democrats in
the House and almost half (forty-nine percent) of the Democrats in the Senate. By the
1990s it was more difficult to break down support and opposition to free trade by simple
party identification. Unions, traditional allies of the Democrats, were at the forefront of
* The support of the General Research Board, University of Maryland-College Park, and the
Everett McKinley Dirksen Center for Congressional Leadership is greatly appreciated.
** Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland-College Park, College Park,
Maryland 20742, euslaner@gvpt.umd.edu.
1. This and the preceding paragraph, as well as much of the first section of this paper, follows
Uslaner (1994).
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the opposition to NAFTA. Business, traditional allies of the Republicans, tended to sup-
port free trade,. but there were many fissions in the economic dividing lines. Businesses
hard hit by global trade, such as the shoe industry and agriculture, favored protection.
Environmentalists, also traditional allies of the Democrats, were even more badly split
(Audley and Uslaner, 1994). Trade opponents on both the left and the right worried
about both child labor practices and civil liberties more generally in countries that would
benefit from trade accords.
Within the Republican Party, divisions arose between free marketers and social conser-
vatives. The social conservatives such as Pat Buchanan (now of the Reform Party) offered
a populist message that echoed the arguments of labor and the more radical environmen-
talists about the exploitation of workers by multinational business. Religious conserva-
tives viewed trade accords with suspicion. Many in the Christian right worried that coun-
tries hostile to the West wanted to dictate international economic and cultural policies to
the United States. The best way to protect the American way of life, and Christianity in
particular, was to remain as self-sufficient as possible-and thus as independent as possi-
ble of other nations. Social and religious conservatives became a more potent force in the
Republican Party, especially after the 1994 election that propelled the G.O.P. to power..
With the rise in power of the religious right, the Republican hegemony in favor of free
trade began to wane.
Democrats, particularly in the House, did not come back to free trade easily. Many,
even most, did not come back at all. Yet Clinton and both of his presumptive Democratic
successors in the Presidency-Vice President Al Gore and former New Jersey Senator Bill
Bradley-have sung the praises of open markets. What has brought the Democrats back
to free trade? And why have many Republicans veered away from free trade, which was a
fundamental part of the doctrine of unfettered market competition?
The two most prominent explanations for party positions on trade are institutional
and coalitional. First, presidents look out for the national interest and Congress is con-
cerned with particularistic benefits. So when the Republicans took over the presidency,
they shifted toward more free trade-and when the Democrats regained the presidency,
they too became more supportive of open markets. Second, the coalitional argument sug-
gests that the Democrats moved away from free trade because organized labor pushed
them in that direction. As labor became protectionist, so did the party that depended
upon them.
Both of these arguments have a grain of truth, but they are both mostly wrong. I shall
offer an alternative argument, which I call the partisan perspective. Most economists
accept the argument that free trade stimulates economic growth (Passell, 1993; Blustein,
1996). And most political scientists accept the argument that a booming economy helps
the incumbent party win reelection (see Tufte, 1978; Fiorina, 1981; Gelman and King,
1993, among many others).
Putting these two arguments together leads to a very simple but powerful argument,
the partisan perspective: open markets lead to increased prosperity-and in turn to
greater electoral success for the party espousing free trade. The contemporary
Democratic Party, at least at the presidential level, supports free trade because open mar-
kets bring the prosperity that helped Democrats keep the presidency in 1996. The party of
free trade is the party voters see as best for the economy-and the party that is likely to
win the presidency. And the party that embraces an optimistic view of the future is the
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one that is most likely to embrace open markets and to fashion itself as the party that can
convert its positive view into real prosperity. Yet a party cannot keep its eyes on the prize
if it is burdened by the claims of its most avid supporters, who tend to be more support-
ive of protectionist barriers.
II. Objections, Alternatives, and Explications.
The partisan perspective is simple and straightforward. I shall show that there is also
strong evidence for it. But it is also counterintuitive in at least two ways. First, it presumes
that people will vote for something they do not want. Over almost two decades, the
American public has consistently supported protectionism over free trade (Schneider,
1992, 58; Uslaner, 1998a). So why should they vote for a party that promises them free
trade? Secondly, this argument holds that free trade is the hallmark of a party that wants
to foster prosperity. What party does not favor prosperity?
The partisan perspective can overcome these two objections rather easily. Americans
do support protectionism over free trade, but these positions are not fixed in stone. And
trade rarely is a salient issue, either in public opinion or elections. So parties have consid-
erable freedom to maneuver-and to change positions-on the trade issue. People do not
vote on specific economic policies as much as they do on the results of the policy. If free
trade brings about economic growth, political leaders have the flexibility to pursue open
markets even if the public favors protectionism. As Chairman Deng Xiao Ping of China
said, "It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white. What matters is whether it catch-
es mice."
But political leaders are not always quite so free to choose their policy instruments.
Parties are often the captives of their strongest supporters. Labor and environmentalists
push Democrats away from free trade and religious conservatives lead Republicans in the
same direction. Now, this is part of the political tug of war and there is nothing excep-
tional about it. Each party has loyal interest groups that expect the party to behave in cer-
tain ways. And each party "owns" issues that bring it electoral advantages (Axelrod, 1972;
Petrocik, 1981, 1996). Democrats are pulled by labor to keep unemployment low-and in
.turn gain greater credibility with the broader electorate as the party that is better at creat-
ing jobs. The Republicans are tugged to the right on issues of personal morality by reli-
gious conservatives-and outscore the Democrats among the general public as the party
better able to handle such issues. This "upside" of issue ownership gives each party an
edge, often decisive, among the full electorate on issues that are near and dear to its most
devoted supporters. Parties can eat their cake (take real issue positions) and have it too
(win votes through issues). 2
Issues are not always the key to success in presidential elections. How well the incumbent
party has handled the economy generally is more important than ideological concerns
(Fiorina, 1981). Rational political leaders prefer maximum flexibility on economic policy-
and this puts them at odds with their most loyal supporters. This is the downside of "issue
ownership" Parties can become the captives of those who back them most fervently.
Parties may lose control over the instruments of economic policy. Labor will fight any
attempt to fight inflation if that risks increasing unemployment-and it will also fight
2. See Hinich and Munger (1994).
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movements to expand trade because it fears that such efforts will cost American jobs. And
the religious right also worries about the power of big business (and has other concerns,
as I shall argue below). So the more parties are the captives of their most powerful sup-
porters, the less flexibility they have to shape economic policy to their electoral advantage.
It is not much help for the Democrats to be the party of job creation when the unemploy-
ment rate is high, as Jimmy Carter realized in 1980. 3 When interest groups have a stran-
glehold over policy-making, economic growth will be lower (Olson, 1982).
A party's most devoted supporters cannot always control the issue positions candidates
(even presidential candidates) espouse. Sometimes the Democratic Party has followed the
platforms of organized labor and other groups and at other times it has taken a more cen-
trist course. In 1972, Democratic nominee George McGovern was said to be the captive of
anti-war activists and left-leaning activists. In 1984, Democratic nominee (and Vice
President) Walter Mondale was widely denounced for being beholden to labor, environ-
mentalists, and feminist groups. Mondale had no agenda of his own, critics charged. Bill
Clinton sought to divorce himself and the Democratic Party from such charges in 1992.
Clinton proclaimed himself a "new Democrat,' who was not beholden to the traditional
range of groups that had marked Democratic Party politics. In 1993 he attacked labor for
its "rough-shod, muscle-bound" tactics in exposing NAFTA (Devroy, 1993). Clinton suc-
ceeded where McGovern and Mondale failed. He was elected president and used his
maneuvering room to steer the economy to its longest boom ever. Free trade was a key
part of his agenda, even as both McGovern and Mondale heeded the call of labor to pro-
pose protection of American jobs through tariffs.
The lesson seems to be that presidents need maneuvering room-and that is partially
correct. Since the president is the only nationally elected leader, we tend to assume that
presidents think globally (cf. Goldstein, 1986, 215; Manley, 1970, 331). Members of
Congress act locally: Former Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill reminded legislators that, "all
politics is local." The pressures that come from Congressional districts are more likely to
be for protection than for free trade (O'Halloran, 1994; Schiller, 1999). But not all nation-
al politics are global. Presidents (not to mention presidential candidates), as well as legis-
lators have sought higher tariff rates (Magee and Young, 1987; Pastor, 1983). And
Congress has often responded to executive calls for free trade-as the NAFTA experience
in 1993 showed. A simple institutional explanation is insufficient.
The presumption that only interest group pressure matters is also insufficient.4 The
Democrats backed off from their traditional free trade position somewhat earlier than
labor gave up on its similar commitments to open markets. The Democratic withdrawal
from open markets reflected tensions within the party about America's role in the world
and what the future would look like for the United States. Democrats were torn apart in
the 1960s by the conflict over Vietnam, and many argued that the United States should
look inward rather than outward. The theme of the 1972 Democratic nominee,
McGovern, was "Come Home, America." But the movement toward a more isolationist
policy had begun earlier. The 1968 Democratic platform still called for free trade-and
was noticeably less protectionist than the G.O.P. platform-but it also indicated a shift
toward tariffs and other barriers. In 1964, the Democrats pledged to "break down barriers
3. The civilian unemployment rate jumped from 5.8 percent in 1979 to 7.1 percent in 1980.
4. This paragraph follows Uslaner (1994).
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against unfair competition." By 1968, the Democrats warned against "unfair and destruc-
tive competition" (emphasis added).
The war, the end of the economic boom of the early and mid-1960s, and race riots in
America's cities destroyed the heart and soul of the Democratic Party. Even more critical-
ly, this unhappy confluence of events crushed the party's most valuable asset, the sense of
optimism that was the hallmark of Woodrow Wilson, Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy,
and especially Franklin D. Roosevelt ("the only thing we have to fear is fear itself"). Even
Hubert Humphrey, the "Happy Warrior:' seemed dispirited as he ran for president in
1968 as the leader of a divided and disconsolate party. The Democrats became the party
of protectionism, because it had no clear vision of a bright future.
The nadir, of course, came during Jimmy Carter's administration and the two energy
crises. In the first, Carter sat in the White House in a cardigan sweater and told the
American people that they had to make sacrifices because the American dream of a better
tomorrow was, in effect, over. Even though he did not use the word, the fireside chat
became known as Carter's "malaise" speech. And it was perfect political fodder for
Reagan's upbeat campaign in 1980. Reagan promised that, "America is back:' endorsing
unfettered markets at home and abroad.
Free trade is a prescription for economic growth. But trade stems from an optimistic
world view-the belief that the gains from trade are greater than the risks, and that trade
will create new jobs rather than take away old ones (Uslaner, 1998a). More critically, open
markets depend upon a view that the other countries that we trade with are seeking
mutual advantage rather than to exploit our markets (through underpaid laborers, gov-
ernment-subsidized dumping, suspension of environmental regulations, or human
rights). Trade negotiators and diplomats know (or ought to know) the culture of poten-
tial trading partners. But most people, including legislators, do not have this detailed
knowledge much of the time. 5
How do we determine whether the United States should sign a free trade pact or extend
most-favored-nation status to Romania, Thailand, or Peru? We make leaps of faith-and this
faith depends upon our world view about others. Are people from distant lands fundamen-
tally different from or similar to us? How we decide this depends upon our assumptions
about human nature-and especially whether we believe that "most people can be trusted"
Trust is the presumption that people who may be different from us are nevertheless part of
our moral community-and it rests upon the optimistic foundation that the world tomor-
row will be better than the world today. And people who trust other people are more likely to
favor free trade. And countries with higher levels of trust are also more likely to have open
markets (Uslaner, 1999, chs. 2, 6, and 7).6 The upbeat and trusting party is the party of free
trade-and ultimately, of prosperity. Political leaders have leeway to pursue alternative eco-
nomic policies when their followers have faith in politicians' abilities to control the economy.
When voters and especially loyal supporters have less confidence in our capacity to shape our
economic future, they press politicians to defend the resources people have. And this is when
group pressure becomes stronger and more difficult for parties to resist.
5. Clearly they do some of the time. Trade pacts with Canada or the United Kingdom do not
require leaps of faith about cultural differences.
6. These results are based upon multivariate analysis at the individual level and simultaneous-
equation estimation at the aggregate level (with countries having a legacy of Communism
excluded).
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The key actors are, then, parties and voters-much more so than presidents and mem-
bers of Congress. Presidents count, because it is through the race for the White House
that we see most dramatically the conflicts between the two major parties. Interest groups
matter-but they are not independent entrepreneurs. Interest groups seeking protection
must convince office holders in both the legislative and executive branch of the worthi-
ness of their pleas, in terms of both policy and electoral benefits. Against these arguments
are the familiar claims by economists that free trade promotes economic growth-and the
collective benefits for belonging to a political party that brings prosperity to the country.
III. The Evidence for the Partisan Perspective.
If my argument is correct, the party that is more oriented toward open markets will be
more likely to win presidential elections. I perform a very rough test of the perspective as
follows: I first classify the two major party platform trade planks from 1944 to 1996. I
assign a score of +2 if the Democrats were considerably more pro-free trade than the
Republicans, +1 if the Democrats were slightly more pro-free trade, 0 if both parties took
similar positions, -1 if the Democrats were slightly more protectionist, and -2 if the
Democrats were more strongly protectionist. I adjusted the score by subtracting one if a
Republican candidate (Eisenhower) or a Democratic candidate (Carter) was a free trader
when his party platform indicated otherwise. 7
I present this rough test of the partisan perspective in Table 1. And the results are strik-
ing. Of the fourteen presidential elections from 1944 to 1996, ten provide a clear-cut test
of the perspective. In the other four, the parties were judged to have similar positions on
trade. In nine of the ten cases where there is a clear prediction, the party more favorable
to free trade won the presidential election. The only exception is 1968, a very close contest
where the Democrats lost despite having a less protectionist message. But the Democrats
were divided along many other lines of cleavage. For the four cases in which the parties
had identical scores on the free trade measure, the Democrats won two and the
Republicans won two. The ordinal correlations between the measure of party advantage
on free trade and a dummy variable for whether the Democrats or Republicans won the
presidential election are .635 (tau-c) and .907 (gamma).
7. For the party platform statements on trade, see Uslaner (1994), 36-40. Sources are listed on p.
40. For the 1996 Democratic platform, see
http://www.democrats.org/hq/resources/platform/index.html
For the 1996 Republican platform, see
http://www.gopnm.org/gopnm/platforms/plat3.html#trade
The texts of the platforms presented in Uslaner (1994) should provide evidence that the test is
not tautological and that the rough categorizations I have employed are realistic portrayals of
party stands on trade.
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TABLE 1
Democratic Presidential Victories and Party Advantages on Free Trade, 1944-1996
Party Advantage on Free Trade
GOP Major GOP Slight Neither party Democratic Democratic Total
Advantage Advantage Advantaged Slight Major
Advantage Advantage
Republican
Victory 2 2 2 1 0 7
100% 100% 50% 33% 0% 50%
Democratic
Victory 0 0 2 2 3 7
0% 0% 50% 67% 100% 50%
Total 2 2 4 3 3 
tau-c = .637 gamma = .907 Chi-square = 7.333 (p < .060)
The party that is more supportive of free trade is also more likely to be seen as better
able to handle the nation's economic problems.8 The relationship is strong: the R2 for a
simple bivariate time-series regression with a correction (Cochrane-Orcutt) for autocor-
relation is .597. When the Democrats are viewed as substantially more pro-free trade than
the Republicans, they would gain almost an extra nineteen percent of the public saying
that they are better equipped to handle the economy than the Republicans. Even when
they are just moderately more pro-free trade than the Republicans, they gain more than
nine percent.
So there is a direct route from free trade positions to public approval of the party that
favors open markets. And there is also a powerful relationship between the party rated
better on the economy and the party that wins the White House. I estimated models
using both generalized least squares (to correct for autocorrelation) and probit analysis
(since the dependent variable-whether the Democrats or Republicans won the presiden-
tial election)-with very similar results. The probit analysis correctly predicts almost two-
thirds of the elections-while the generalized least squares estimation shows results at
least as powerful, predicting almost eighty percent of the elections correctly.9 This very
simple GLS model produces an R2 of .733. When the Republicans are most highly favored
on the economy, the probability that the Democrats will win the election is a mere .055.
When the public is most positive toward the Democrats, they are almost certain to win
the presidential contest (probability = .999).
8. The data for 1944 to 1988 were extrapolated from Stanley and Niemi (1992, 168). For 1992 and
1996 1 obtained the data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) codebooks
available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The
measure is the percentage of the public saying that the Democrats would handle the economy
better minus the percentage saying that the Republicans would handle the economy better.
9. There was also evidence of heteroskedasticity, so both the generalized least squares and probits
were estimated xith robust standard errors. The elections predicted incorrectly by the general-
ized least squares estimation were 1952, 1968, and 1992.
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Trade has effects on presidential election outcomes even beyond its impact on which party
is best able to handle the overall economy. Whether we estimate a model by probit or GLS,
the party voters see as best on the economy is strongly favored to win the presidency. For the
probit estimates, adding trade to the mix helps predictive power considerably)10 Taking a
position in favor of open markets helps a party win presidential elections, even beyond the
direct link between trade positions and perceptions of party competence.
TABLE 2
Generalized Least Squares Estimates of Democratic Presidential Victories, 1944-1996
Coefficient Standard Error t Ratio
Party preferred on economy .023** .003 6.900
Party advantage on free trade .190* .097 1.963
Constant .462 .436 1.057
R2 = .832 Adjusted R2 = .798 RMSE = .291
N 13 (with correction for autocorrelation)
** p<.0001 *p<.05
Estimation by generalized least squares with Cochrane-Orcutt correction for autocorrelation
and with robust (White-corrected) standard errors.
IV. Why the Democrats Have Returned to Free Trade.
The model I have proposed offers an explanation of why parties would emphasize free
trade. But it does not help explain why one party becomes more supportive of free trade
than the other-so that it has an advantage in being seen as the party of prosperity. And
specifically it does not tell us why the Democrats (or at least Democratic presidential can-
didates) have been more favorable to free trade than the Republicans. After all, the
Democrats in Congress remain relatively protectionist.
The Democrats have been more favorable to free trade in recent years because they
have been more successful in reigning in the members of their electoral coalition who are
opposed to trade than the Republicans have been. Democratic leaders who wish to pursue
open markets and build up a reputation as the party of prosperity must battle protection-
ist pressures from environmentalists and especially from labor. Republican leaders must
fight the Christian right.
Which set of party leaders has the easier job? Alas, data on the internal battles party
leaders fight with clientele groups are scarce at best. Instead, I use public opinion data to
get a handle on the roots of support for free trade and protection in the electorate-and
within party coalitions.
10. Adding the party best on trade increases the number of correct predictions from ten to twelve
(out of fourteen). There is no corresponding increase for the GLS estimation (which correctly
predicts eleven of fourteen elections). The probit employing only the party favored on the
economy predicts the 1944, 1952, 1992, and 1996 elections incorrectly. The probit with both
variables misses only 1968 and 1992.
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I estimated probit analyses of support for restricting imports from the 1998 American
National Election Study (ANES), first for all voters, and then for Democratic and
Republican party identifiers separately." 1 I report these probits in Table 3. The indepen-
dent variables include trust in other people, support for restrictions on immigration, age,
living in a Western state, favoring stronger environmental regulations, having a union
member in the family, and support for the Christian right on the ANES "feeling ther-
mometer" (ranging from a hostile zero to a very "warm" 99). For the probits in Table 3, 1
report the coefficients, standard errors, significance levels, and "effects." The effect is a
measure of the change in probabilities from the minimum to the maximum values of the
independent variables with all other variables held constant. It is the standard measure of
the impact of probit estimates (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).12
11. To ensure that these results are not idiosyncratic, I estimated a similar model from the 1996
General Social Survey. As with the 1998 ANES model, I found that trust in other people, atti-
tudes on immigration (does immigration create or take away jobs), identification as a
Christian fundamentalist, and belonging to a union family all shaped attitudes on restricting
trade. So did education and satisfaction with one's personal financial situation, which were not
significant in the 1998 estimation.
12. Probit coefficients, unlike regression coefficients, have no clear interpretation because the pro-
bit estimator is not linear. Note that the effects for age are calculated between eighteen and sev-
enty-five.
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As I noted above, trust in other people is a key determinant of support for less restric-
tive trade policies because it reflects an openness to people who may be different from
yourself. Closely connected is a person's position on immigration (which also depends
upon trust in others, see Uslaner, 1999, ch. 5) and is therefore reflective of the same inclu-
siveness of people of diverse backgrounds. Younger people have grown up in a global
community and should be more open to trade. And the West has an economy that is
heavily dependent on foreign trade, so I expect people living there should be less likely to
favor restrictions on imports. Environmentalists (who favor stronger regulations on busi-
ness), people from union families, and supporters of the Christian right should all be
more likely to favor limiting imports. But the impacts should be different for each party,
according to the theory of issue ownership. Environmentalists and union families should
push Democrats (but not Republicans) away from free trade, while backers of the
Christian right should have lead Republicans (but not Democrats) toward protectionism.
Blacks are also core supporters of the Democratic Party. African-Americans have not
fared so well economically during the economic boom of the Clinton years. Many black
leaders have argued that free trade has cost more jobs than it has brought in the African-
American community. So blacks should join with environmentalists and union families
in pushing the Democratic Party away from free trade. Finally, I expect that Democrats
should be more supportive of trade restrictions, even taking into account all of the other
factors pushing them toward protectionism.
Most of these predictions are borne out in the probits. But I focus only on those that
help explain partisan differences. The other variables are included primarily to have a
well-specified model. For all respondents, the most powerful determinant of trade atti-
tudes is a person's position on immigration. People who want to restrict immigration are
strongly in favor of limiting imports. So are blacks, environmentalists, and backers of the
Christian right. Union families are also somewhat more likely to favor limiting imports,
but the effect is considerably smaller (.121) than for other groups. Overall, people with
positive views of the Christian right are the most strongly in favor of restricting trade.
Blacks and environmentalists also favor less open markets. And on the surface it seems
that the combined impact for African-Americans, environmentalists, and union families
might push Democrats further away from free trade than the Christian right would move
the G.O.P.
Yet separate analyses for the Democrats and Republicans show that Republicans seem
to be at least as vulnerable to their core constituents' pressures than are Democrats.
Among Democrats, blacks and union families are each about sixteen percent less sup-
portive of open markets than are whites and families without union members. Among
Democratic identifiers, strong environmentalists are about twenty percent more likely to
favor restricting imports. But Republicans are equally pushed toward protection by their
supporters who back environmental regulations. Supporters of the Christian right move
the G.O.P. quite far toward protectionism. The strongest backers of the religious right are
almost forty percent more likely to say that the United States should limit imports com-
pared to people who give fundamentalists a zero rating.
There is clear evidence of issue ownership. Union families and African-Americans are
less likely to support open markets among Democratic Party identifiers only. And Christian
fundamentalists are less likely to back import liberalization, but only among Republican
identifiers.
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Overall, Republicans are moved more by their constituency groups (including environ-
mentalists) than are Democrats. Among Democrats, African-Americans, union families,
environmentalists, and opponents of increased immigration are sixty-five percent more
likely to favor import limitations than are people with mirror image traits (whites, etc.).
But for Republicans, environmentalists, Christian fundamentalists, non-westerners, and
opponents of immigration, eighty-eight percent are more supportive of trade barriers.
Constituency pressures toward protection are stronger for Republican identifiers than
for Democrats. Now, I have no evidence on decision-making by elites, but it is hardly
unreasonable to presume that these issue publics within each party bubble up.
Congressional districts are smaller and more homogenous than national electorates-and
this gives more power to the party's core supporters who push for more protection. In
this sense, the 1994 Congressional elections that brought many more self-identified
Christian conservatives into the House Republican Conference helped tilt the G.O.P. away
from its free trade message of the 1980s. Similarly, unions can influence congressional
(especially House) Democrats because of the close ties between labor and Democrats at
the local level.
Unions became less central to the centrist Democratic agenda in 1992. Even as they
fought NAFTA with all their hearts and souls in 1993, unions became almost peripheral
to Clinton's "new Democratic" agenda. Ironically, labor political action committee contri-
butions had more influence on the voting behavior of House Republicans on the NAFTA
vote than they did on how House Democrats cast their ballots (Uslaner, 1998b).
The renewal of the Democratic romance with free trade came about because national
Democrats broke with their most loyal followers to reach out to the larger electorate.
They put aside their natural issue advantage of staying with labor, environmentalists, and
African-Americans in an attempt to broaden the party's electoral appeal. Clinton pictured
the Democrats as the party of prosperity, much as Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and
Johnson had done before him-and that Reagan and Bush had done for the Republicans.
To make the case compelling, party leaders have to demonstrate independence from
interests that offer a less optimistic picture of the national economy. And in the 1990s, the
Democrats regained their historic role as the party of open and prosperous markets.
The renewed romance of the Democrats with free trade may be a case of only partially
requited love. It may reflect, as Samuel Johnson said of second marriages, the "triumph of
hope over experience." 13 Clinton was able to push many House Democrats to support
NAFTA in 1993 because labor had become less central to the Democratic base. Clintoin
carried many states and Congressional districts in 1992 where labor was weak-both in
terms of membership and campaign contributions.14
Yet the party still had strong ties to groups that viewed free trade as anathema. Indeed,
in 1996 and especially in 1998, organized labor fought a prolonged yet ultimately unsuc-
cessful battle to restore a Democratic majority in the House. But labor became a more
13. Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, third ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 275.
14. The correlation between the Clinton share of the vote in Congressional districts and the pro-
portion of the work force that is unionized was .27 in 1992. The correlation between union
campaign contributions to Congressional candidates and the Clinton vote in 1992 was just .28.
See Uslaner (1998b) for the data sources. There was a higher correlation (.53) between union
campaign contributions and the share of the vote for Democratic House candidates.
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potent force in Democratic politics. The Democrats lost the House in 1994 for the first
time in forty years and with control of the Congress went the largesse of big business.
Never in philosophical tune with the Democrats, business nevertheless was a substantial
donor to Democratic House incumbents. The Democrats, as the majority party, con-
trolled the policy agenda in Congress and business had no place else to go (Jacobson,
1983, ch. 4). But when the Democrats lost the House in 1994, business shifted their cam-
paign contributions to the Republicans and the Democrats had to rely more heavily on
labor. In 1996, union contributions amounted to almost half of all political action com-
mittee receipts for the Democrats-up from thirty-two percent in 1992. And this finan-
cial clout gave labor the influence to push House Democrats away from free trade-and
to the defeat of fast track authority in 1997 and 1998 (Abramson with Greenhouse, 1997;
Eilperin, 1998).
In the wake of protests by environmentalists and human rights activists at the World
Trade Organization summit in Seattle in late 1999, Clinton promised to link future trade
accords to labor, environmental, and human rights issues. But he did not back down on
his fundamental commitment to free trade and neither did the two Democrats who
sought to succeed him in the White House.
The Democratic return to free trade is incomplete. On both of Clinton's major free
trade victories, NAFTA and the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the
People's Republic of China, fewer than forty percent of House Democrats voted with
their president. 15 On other initiatives, such as fast track authority in 1997 and 1998,
House Democrats did not provide sufficient support to allow their own president to pre-
vail. While presidents pay heed to the public at large, members of Congress are more
localistic. They respond to calls for protection from their districts. Thus we have a two-
level game (cf. Putnam, 1988): House members' votes are shaped more by special interests
while presidents' trade stands reflect broader national concerns.
Mayer's essay in this volume shows how core Democratic groups such as labor and
environmentalists have entered trade politics with shrill voices. They have pushed
Democratic legislators away from free trade and limited presidents' ability to negotiate
tariff reductions with other countries. James and Lusztig show in their essay that these
core Democratic constituency groups are powerful enough to make projections of presi-
dential victory hazardous. When presidents do win, they must fight tooth and nail for
every vote. And, more critically, they must mobilize business support in expensive cam-
paigns to shift public attitudes (Burgess, 2000; Uslaner, 1998b). Mayer, James and Lusztig,
and Poitras (also in this volume) all suggest that presidents cannot count on
Congressional support because these interest groups have become both more powerful
and more dedicated to defeating trade bills.
I beg to differ at least in part. Presidents do have to fight hard for trade bills, but this is
not new. Trade has long been a contentious issue and presidents have not always had their
way. Yes, building coalitions is harder now on trade, but it is harder on all sorts of legisla-
tion as the level of partisan polarization has increased in legislative politics (Rohde,
1991). Democrats are more likely to oppose their president than to support him. Yet
labor, environmentalists, and human rights activists have failed to stop NAFTA and
PNTR. On both votes Clinton secured sufficient Democratic votes for passage.
15. On NAFTA, thirty-nine percent voted with Clinton; on PNTR, thirty-five percent voted with him.
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Many Congressional Democrats supported the free trade message of the White House
because they were not putting themselves at risk. I estimated a model (data not present-
ed) of voting behavior in the 1998 Congressional elections. Voters cast ballots for the
House for the party they felt best able to help the American family-though they did not
favor candidates because they believed their party would better handle crime, foreign
affairs, Social Security, the environment, or the economy generally. And positions on
imports had no significant impact at all on elections. There was not even a trace of a
Republican gain on the trade issue. The Democrats had a very slight, though insignifi-
cant, gain from free trade (three percent effect). 16
Congressional Democrats paid no electoral price for tolerating or even supporting the
free trade initiatives of their president. And as long as the economy was healthy, the party
responsible for the good times could hardly fail to benefit. Free trade was good to
Congressional Democrats-in more ways than one. It divided the Republicans and high-
lighted conflicts that made the Republicans look bad to many voters.
Support of NAFTA was not costless to Congressional Democrats. As labor became a
more important force in funding Democratic House races, it used its advantage strategi-
cally. Democrats who backed NAFTA received less money from unions in 1994 and labor
particularly targeted members in close races (Francia, 2001). Yet, there is little evidence
that Democratic incumbents who lost labor contributions also lost votes. As the 2000
elections approached, Democrats seemed an even bet to retake the House, and business
contributions once more flowed to the party (Eilperin, 2000b). Labor money became less
critical to Democrats-and labor influence waned.
The prospect for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is thus not so glum. On
both NAFTA and PNTR, enough Democrats backed their president to ensure victory.
Had Clinton fought harder for fast track, he might have prevailed there as well. The
model for the FTAA might be that of NAFTA and PNTR, where a sustained fight will be
needed for victory. But it might be that of Clinton's initiative for trade liberalization with
the Caribbean, Central America, and Africa-which passed both houses of Congress by
overwhelming margins in May 2000-and even garnered the votes of forty-five percent of
House Democrats. The partisan perspective should make us more optimistic, rather than
pessimistic, about the prospects for trade liberalization.
Republican Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (IL) has said that free trade is the best
"agent for democratic change and economic growth and individual prosperity" (Eilperin,
2000a). The party that stakes out the clearest support for open markets should fare best in
the election-but each party must keep its own most loyal supporters in check first.
16. I estimated the model by probit analysis. The dependent variable was the party vote for the
House of Representatives. For 247 voters, the model correctly predicted eighty percent of vote
choices, compared to 61.5 percent for a null model. Other variables in the model are party
identification (significant at p < .0001), a dummy for the South (significant at p < .01, with
greater support for Republican candidates in the South), Clinton job approval (not signifi-
cant), and identification as a born-again Christian (not significant).
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